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This paper studies coalition formation and payoﬀ division in apex
games under the following assumptions: ﬁrst, payoﬀ division can only
be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining);
second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a
new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). In contrast with
the results of other two-stage models, all minimal winning coalitions
may form and expected payoﬀs coincide with the per capita nucleolus.
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11 Introduction
Noncooperative models of coalition formation usually assume that players
can agree on payoﬀ division at the time they form a coalition (see e.g. Sel-
ten (1981), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Okada
(1996)). However, there are situations in which players form coalitions be-
fore agreeing on payoﬀ division: in coalition governments, parties cannot
negotiate eﬀectively on all issues before the formation of the government,
partly because one does not know exactly which issues will come up (see
Aumann and Myerson (1988)). A coalition is then understood as a negotia-
tion group: if coalition S forms, it means that players in S bargain over the
division of v(S). In this context, it is natural to think that negotiations may
break down, resulting in the dissolution of the coalition and possibly in the
formation of a new one (see the discussion in Aumann and Dr` eze (1974)).
We will refer to the ﬁrst class of models (in which players agree on payoﬀ
division at the time the coalition is formed) as one-stage models, and to the
second class (in which player agree on payoﬀ division after the coalition has
formed) as two-stage models. Coalition formation in two-stage models can
be thought of as reversible or irreversible, depending on whether players can
change coalitions. We will be interested in two-stage reversible processes.
The two-stage models studied in the literature are hybrid: the process
of coalition formation is modeled as a noncooperative game, but payoﬀ divi-
sion is determined by a cooperative solution concept (Hart and Kurz (1983),
Aumann and Myerson (1988)).1 A fully noncooperative approach has been
missing, with the important exception of the models of bargaining in mar-
kets, in which only two-player coalitions can form (see Osborne and Rubin-
stein (1990) and Muthoo (1999)).
In this paper, we study a fully noncooperative game of coalition forma-
tion and payoﬀ division. The formation of a coalition means the beginning
of negotiations between the players in the coalition over the division of the
coalitional value. Negotiations can break down, in which case the coalition
1Aumann and Myerson (1988) clearly have irreversible coalitions in mind, since they
assume that payoﬀ division does not depend on the players’ opportunities outside the
coalition. In contrast, Hart and Kurz (1983) see coalitions as reversible.
2is dissolved and a new coalition may be formed. Motivated by the case of
government formation, we analyze in detail a very common type of majority
games: apex games.
In apex games there is a major player and n − 1 ≥ 3 minor players. In
order for a coalition to be winning, it must contain the major player together
with a minor player, or all the minor players together. The major player
seems to be stronger than the minor players. However, Hart and Kurz (1984)
and Aumann and Myerson (1988) predict that the coalition of all minor
players always forms, so that the a priori strongest player gets nothing.2
The results of our model are quite robust to the details of the bargaining
process and radically diﬀerent from those of the hybrid models: expected
payoﬀs coincide with the per capita nucleolus (see Maschler (1992)), which
gives most of the payoﬀ to the apex player. Payoﬀ division conditional on
the apex coalition being formed corresponds to the one often suggested as
reasonable (see the discussion in Davis and Maschler (1967)).
Compared with one-stage models, two-stage models may seem to protect
the minor players. After all, once a minor player forms a coalition with
the apex player the two players are in a more symmetric position, and if
coalitions were irreversible one would expect the two players to divide the
payoﬀ equally. However, we will see that, because coalitions are reversible,
the minor players are actually worse-oﬀ in the two-stage model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the two-stage game and some general properties of the equilibria. Section
3 studies the case of apex games in detail. Section 4 concludes with some
further remarks on the comparison with the literature and on possible ex-
tensions.
2 The game
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of players (parties) and (N,v) a proper
simple characteristic function game (v(S) = 0 or 1 for all S ⊂ N, v(N) = 1,
2There are also variants of those models that predict that the grand coalition will
always form (see Slikker (2000)).
3v(∅) = 0 and v(S) + v(N\S) ≤ 1). The characteristic function v indicates
which coalitions of parties have a majority. We will assume that all players
in N are risk neutral and discount future payoﬀs with a discount factor
δ < 1.
Given the underlying characteristic function game, bargaining proceeds
as follows:
• Nature selects a proposer according to a probability distribution θ
(θi ≥ 0 for all i and
P
i∈N θi = 1).
• The selected proposer i proposes a coalition S such that S 3 i.
• Players in S accept or reject the proposal sequentially. If one of them
rejects, a period elapses and Nature selects a new proposer according
to the probability distribution θ.
• If all players in S accept, coalition S is formed. If S is a losing coali-
tion, the game ends and all players get 0. If S is a winning coalition,
players in S bargain over the division of the budget. The ”internal”
game, played only by players in S, is a bargaining game with random
proposers (Nature follows a probability distribution θS with θS
i ≥ 0
for all i ∈ S and
P
i∈S θS
i = 1) and breakdown probability. A proposal




Every time a responder rejects a proposal, coalition S is dissolved with
probability 1 − p (0 < p < 1).
• If coalition S is dissolved, Nature selects a proposer again according
to the probability distribution θ.
We will be interested in stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SPE).
Since coalition formation occurs before payoﬀ division, we can think of
the extensive game described above as a two-stage game. Of course, both the
coalition formation ”stage” and the payoﬀ division ”stage” are complicated
objects and the play may bring the players back from the second to the ﬁrst
stage.
4We will refer to the probability distribution θ as the protocol, and to
θS as the internal protocol. Let y be the expected equilibrium payoﬀ vector
computed before Nature starts the game, and yS be the expected equilibrium
payoﬀ vector computed after S has formed and before Nature starts the
internal game. Let zS be the vector of continuation values (i.e., expected
payoﬀs after a proposal has been rejected) in the internal game. We start
from the equilibrium of the internal game.
2.1 The equilibrium of the internal game
We now show that the internal game has a unique stationary subgame per-
fect equilibrium.
If a player rejects a proposal in the internal game, with probability p
Nature starts the internal game again (so that player i expects to get yS
i )
and with probability 1 − p coalition S breaks apart and Nature starts the
coalition formation game again (so that player i expects to get yi). We have
the following equation for the continuation value of player i
zS
i = pyS
i + (1 − p)yi
As for yS
i , it is given by the probability i is selected to be a proposer in the
internal game times his expected payoﬀ as a proposer plus the probability
that he is selected to be the responder (which is 1 − θS
i because bargaining
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i < 1 the proposer strictly prefers making acceptable proposals; since in





i = 1 acceptable and unacceptable proposals give the same payoﬀs to the




i = 1 and
P
i∈S yi = 1.
5This is a well-known result in bargaining games with breakdown proba-
bility: player i’s expected payoﬀ equals the breakdown payoﬀ (in this case,
yi) plus a share of the surplus proportional to the probability of being pro-
poser (cf. Binmore (1987) and Binmore et al. (1986)).
Equation (1) resembles an allocation rule in that each player receives a
share of the available surplus and this share is determined by the internal
protocol. However, there is an important diﬀerence: the payoﬀ a player gets
from being in a coalition is not fully determined by the rules of the internal
game because the breakdown outcome is endogenous.
Let s denote |S|. The ﬁrst possibility that comes to mind regarding the
internal protocol θS is the egalitarian protocol, θS
i = 1





j∈S yj) + yi.
2.2 The equilibrium of the game
If player i is selected to be a proposer at the coalition formation stage, he
will choose one of the coalitions which maximize his expected payoﬀ. Thus,
he will choose S such that θS
i (1 −
P
j∈S yj) is maximized. If θS
i = 1
s for all
i ∈ S, player i will choose a coalition with maximal per capita excess at y.4
Lemma 1 If for any player i there is a winning coalition S 3 i such that
θS
i > 0, then in any SPE a winning coalition is formed without delay.
Proof. By proposing coalition S, player i can get at least yi; by making
an unacceptable proposal he gets δyi. Thus, he will strictly prefer to make
acceptable proposals unless yi = 0, which implies
P
j∈S\{i} yj = 1. But if un-
acceptable proposals are made with positive probability, then
P
j∈N\{i} yj <
1, which (since player i can get a positive share of the surplus in coalition
S) contradicts yi = 0. Thus, yi > 0, which implies that a coalition is formed
immediately. Since a losing coalition gives zero to all players, it will never
be proposed or accepted.
Corollary 2 Let λS
i be the probability that player i proposes coalition S. In
4The per capita excess of coalition S at y is given by
1
s[v(S) − y(S)].








































Remark 3 If θS = 1
s for all S ⊂ N, then only minimal winning coalitions
form in an SPE.
3 The case of apex games
Apex games are a special class of weighted majority games with one major
player (the apex player) and n − 1 minor players (also called base players).
If player 1 is the apex player, v(S) = 1 if either {1} ⊆ S and S\{1} 6= ∅,
or S = N\{1}. There are two types of minimal winning coalitions: the
apex player together with one of the minor players, and all the minor play-
ers together. Apex games have received a lot of attention in the literature,
both in theory (Davis and Maschler (1967), Horowitz (1973), Hart and Kurz
(1984), Aumann and Myerson (1988), Bennett and van Damme (1991), Mon-
tero (2002)) and in experiments (Selten and Schuster (1968), Horowitz and
Rapoport (1974), Albers (1978), Rapoport et al. (1978), Rapoport et al.
(1979), Miller (1980), Komorita and Tumonis (1980)). They are also em-
pirically common, especially in parliaments with a small number of parties
(current examples are Catalonia and Nordrhein-Westfalen).




s for all S ⊆ N and for all i ∈ S. As we have seen, this




j∈S yj) + yi.
7As for the probability vector θ, we will assume that all minor players are
treated equally, i.e. θi = θj for any minor players i and j, and that θi > 0
for all i in N. Then the protocol θ is characterized by one parameter, the
probability that the apex player is selected to be the proposer, which can
take any value strictly between 0 and 1.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that, since the internal protocol is egalitarian,
in an SPE each player will propose one of the coalitions containing him with
maximal per capita excess at y. Thus, only minimal winning coalitions can
form in equilibrium. There are two types of minimal winning coalitions:
coalitions consisting of the apex player and one minor player, and the coali-
tion of all minor players. In an SPE all minor players must have the same
expected payoﬀs (see lemma 4), and thus the apex player must be indiﬀerent
between all the minimal winning coalitions containing him.
Lemma 4 If θi = θj for any minor players i and j, then in any SPE
yi = yj.
Proof. Suppose yi > yj. If i is selected to be the proposer, his payoﬀ
will be yi + ∆ (where ∆ = 1
s[v(S) −
P
k∈S yk] for some coalition S which is
optimal for player i). If he is not selected to be the proposer but receives
a proposal to be in a coalition, his average payoﬀ will be yi + ∆0 (where
∆0 ≤ ∆). Let ri the probability that player i receives a proposal from other
players (computed before Nature starts the game). Then




The payoﬀ of player j as a proposer is at least yj + ∆ (if j ∈ S, then j
can always propose coalition S; if j / ∈ S, then j can always propose coalition
{S\{i}} ∪ {j}). Moreover, since yi > yj, whenever i receives a proposal j
receives it as well. Thus
yj ≥ θj [yj + ∆] + ri

yj + ∆0
+ (rj − ri)(yj + ∆00) (3)
where rj ≥ ri and ∆00 ≥ 0. Substracting 3 from 2 and taking into account
θi = θj we obtain
(1 − θi − ri)(yi − yj) ≤ −(rj − ri)(yj + ∆00)
8Since the apex player will never propose to player i, ri < 1 − θi and the
left-hand side of the equation is strictly positive. Since the right-hand side
is at most zero we have a contradiction.
We have shown that in any SPE only minimal winning coalitions may
form and that the apex player must be indiﬀerent between all the coalitions
he can propose. As for the minor players, there are three possible cases:
they may prefer a coalition with the apex player, the minor player coalition,
or they may be indiﬀerent. We will examine each possibility in turn.
Let ya denote the expected payoﬀ for the apex player and ym the ex-
pected payoﬀ for a minor player. We will also denote the probability that
the apex player is selected to be the proposer as θa.
Lemma 5 There is no SPE in which the apex player is always part of the
coalition that forms.
Proof. If all minor players propose to the apex player, the apex player
is always part of a coalition and his expected payoﬀ is given by the equation
ya = ya + 1
2(1−ya −ym). This equation can only hold if ya +ym = 1, which
(since ya +(n−1)ym = 1) implies ya = 1. But then it would not be optimal
for a minor player to propose to the apex player.
Proposition 6 If θa ≥ 1 − 1
n, there is an SPE in which all minor players
propose the minor player coalition.
Proof. If all minor players propose the minor player coalition, expected
equilibrium payoﬀs are given by the following equations (taking into account
that, in order for all minor players to have the same expected payoﬀs, the






(1 − ya − ym)











(1 − ya − ym)

The solution to this system is ya =
θa(n−2)
n(2−θa)−2 and ym =
2(1−θa)
n(2−θa)−2. In
order for this strategy combination to be an equilibrium we need ym+ 1
2(1−
ya − ym) ≤ 1
n−1. This is the case if θa ≥ 1 − 1
n.
9Proposition 7 If θa ≤ 1 − 1
n, there is an SPE in which the minor players
are indiﬀerent between proposing to the apex player or proposing the minor
player coalition.
Proof. The indiﬀerence condition for the minor players, ym+ 1
2(1−ya−
ym) = 1
n−1, together with equation ya+(n−1)ym = 1 implies ya = n−2
n and
ym = 2
n(n−1). In order to construct an equilibrium, we need to ﬁnd mixed
strategies that yield those expected payoﬀs.
For any minor player i, let λi be the probability that i proposes to the
apex player and λ :=
P
i∈N\{1} λi
n−1 . Expected equilibrium payoﬀs for the apex
player are given by





(1 − ya − ym)

.
Substituting for ya and ym, we ﬁnd λ = 1− 1
n(1−θa). In order for λ to be
nonnegative we need θa ≤ 1 − 1
n.
There is a continuum of equilibria, all with the same value of λ.Let µi
the probability that the apex player proposes to player i. Expected payoﬀs
for player i are given by
ym =














i∈N\{1} µi = 1). Any collection of λi’s with
average 1− 1
n(1−θa) and such that 0 ≤ µi ≤ 1 for all i is part of an SPE. The
symmetric equilibrium has λi = λ for any minor player i and µi = 1
n−1.
Remark 8 For θa ≤ 1 − 1
n, expected payoﬀs coincide with the per capita
nucleolus.
The per capita nucleolus is a solution concept introduced by Wallmeier
(1983). Like the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), it is usually thought of as
a normative concept. Suppose we are looking for a fair payoﬀ division for
the value of the grand coalition. Given a possible division y, the diﬀerence
between what a coalition can get by itself, v(S), and what is getting at y,
10y(S), can be thought of as a measure of the dissatisfaction of the coalition
with S, or the temptation to defect from y. The nucleolus minimizes the
largest excess.
Since the decision units are the players and not the coalitions, it makes
sense to measure the temptation to defect by the per capita excess, e(S,y) :=
1
s(v(S) − y(S)), instead of the excess. The per capita nucleolus minimizes
the largest per capita excess.
When we constructed the SPE of the game we proceeded as follows.
Given a candidate expected payoﬀ vector (or a range of payoﬀ vectors), we
constructed the optimal proposing strategies of the players. In all cases, since
the internal protocol is egalitarian, it is optimal for the players to propose
one of the coalitions containing then with maximal per capita excess. Then
we checked whether there were optimal strategy combinations consistent
with the candidate payoﬀ vector or range. This was not always possible:
the expected payoﬀ for the apex player could not be so low that the minor
players would prefer to propose to him. What makes the per capita nucleolus
special is that it makes the players indiﬀerent between several coalitions,
and this in turn means more degrees of freedom when constructing optimal
strategies consistent with the payoﬀ vector.
In two-stage games the payoﬀ a player gets in a coalition does not depend
on who proposed the coalition. In the apex game with an egalitarian internal
protocol and θa ≤ 1− 1
n, we can say something stronger: the payoﬀ a player
gets when entering a coalition is always the same, i.e., in equilibrium players
only enter coalitions that oﬀer them the maximal possible payoﬀ. In other
words, the equilibrium payoﬀs conditional on being in a coalition correspond
to an aspiration (see Bennett (1983)). The particular aspiration vector we
obtain (the apex player gets n−2
n−1 if he enters a coalition, and a minor player
gets 1
n−1) is the one selected by reﬁnements of the aspiration set.
3.2 Apex games with an internal protocol related to pivotal
power
So far, we have assumed that all players have the same proposing power in
the internal game: asymmetries in payoﬀs are due to diﬀerent opportunities
11for the players if negotiations break down. This seems logical in minimal
winning coalitions (all players are pivotal), but less so in larger coalitions.
Changing the internal protocol so that the apex player is selected to be
the proposer more often than a minor player when there are several minor
players makes no diﬀerence to the results unless the probability that the
apex player is chosen to be proposer is increasing (not only in comparison
to that of a minor player, but also in absolute terms) in the number of minor
players in the coalition. In that case coalitions larger than minimal winning
may arise in equilibrium. For illustration, we consider the case in which the
probability that the apex player is selected to be the proposer in the internal
game is s−1
s , where s is the total number of players in the coalition.5 The
payoﬀ the apex player gets as a proposer is




Taking into account that ya = 1 − (n − 1)ym, we obtain
ym(n−s)(s−1)
s .
This expression is maximized for s =
√
n. For n ≥ 6, it is optimal for the
apex player to propose coalitions that are not minimal winning.
More generally, we can study the equilibria of the game in which the
share of the surplus a player gets in a coalition depends on his pivotal power.
For minimal winning coalition the surplus will be divided equally since all
players are equally pivotal. As for larger coalitions, we will assume that the
fraction of the surplus the apex player gets is a function φ of the number
of players in the coalition.6 Suppose we are in equilibrium, and let s be the
size of the optimal coalition for the apex player. Then the expected payoﬀ
for the apex player is
ya = θa [(1 − ya − (s − 1)ym)φ(s) + ya] + (1 − θa)λ





It is easy to check that, in any SPE, all minor players propose the minor
5The number
s−1
s is also the coalition structure Shapley value for the apex player.
6The function φ could be interpreted as a reduced form of a more complicated internal
game in which partial breakdown is possible, resulting in the formation of a smaller coali-
tion. The possibility of partial breakdown makes the apex player proﬁt from bargaining
with several minor players rather than only one.
12player coalition with positive probability. Thus, λ < 1. We look for two
types of equilibria, depending on whether λ = 0 or λ > 0.
Set λ = 0. This is an equilibrium only if solving the equation above we
obtain ya ≥ n−2
2 . This is the case if θa ≥
(n−1)(n−2)
2φ(s)(n−s)+(n−1)(n−2).
A strictly positive λ implies ya = n−2
2 and ym = 2
n(n−1). Substituting for
ya and ym into the equations indeed yields λ =
(n−1)(n−2)(1−θa)−2φ(s)θa(n−s)
n(n−2)(1−θa) .
In order for this value to be larger than 0, we need θa ≤
(n−1)(n−2)
2φ(s)(n−s)+(n−1)(n−2).
Notice that the critical value of θa is large (we can ﬁnd a lower bound for it
by setting s = 0 and φ(s) = 1) and converges to 1 as n grows. This means
that, for most values of the parameter θa, expected payoﬀs coincide with the
per capita nucleolus. Thus, allowing for general internal protocols based on
pivotal power does not change the qualitative results concerning equilibrium
payoﬀs. The only diﬀerence is that coalitions other than minimal winning
may form, and that the equilibrium outcomes do not longer correspond to an
aspiration vector: the minor players may accept oﬀers in which they receive
less than their maximum possible payoﬀ.
A very important assumption we have made is that coalitions cannot
be enlarged once formed. If coalitions can be enlarged and the apex player
proﬁts from proposing coalitions larger than minimal winning, the coalition
of the apex player with only one minor player is not possible: if formed, the
apex player would invite new minor players and they would accept rather
than get 0. Then the choice of the minor players is between the minor player
coalition and a coalition of the optimal size for the apex player, and a mixed
strategy equilibrium need not yield the per capita nucleolus. Interestingly,
equilibrium payoﬀs can be lower for the apex player if coalitions can be
enlarged. This result is in line with Aumann and Myerson (1988).
4 Concluding remarks
The results of two-stage bargaining for apex games are qualitatively sim-
ilar to those of one-stage bargaining (see Montero (2002)) in terms of ex-
pected payoﬀs: there is a large region in which expected payoﬀs are constant,
and the minor players randomize between proposing to the apex player and
13proposing the minor player coalition. With two-stage bargaining the divi-
sion of payoﬀs inside a coalition does not depend on who proposed to form
the coalition, whereas in one-stage bargaining the proposer always gets more
than half of the total payoﬀ. Perhaps surprisingly, the apex player has a
larger expected payoﬀ in the two-stage game, despite of the fact that the
two-stage game might seem to protect the minor players by splitting the
surplus equally. The two-stage model also provides some support for the
formation of coalitions larger than minimal winning, something impossible
in the one-stage model.
One-stage models with random proposers have provided noncoopera-
tive foundations for the nucleolus (see Montero (2001)). One may wonder
whether two-stage models can provide noncooperative foundations for the
per capita nucleolus. The answer is negative, at least for the present model.
A diﬃculty is that players with zero payoﬀs in the per capita nucleolus may
have a positive payoﬀ in the two-stage game, even if they are never chosen
to be proposers.
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